Requirements for Accepting 31aa School Funding for School Safety and Mental Health Ruled Constitutionally Valid

On April 14, 2026, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the waiver of privilege requirement (including attorney-client) for accepting funds for school safety and mental health under Section 31aa of the State School Aid Act is constitutional and legally permissible. Macomb Intermediate School District v State, __ NW3d __ (2026) In this case, the Court considered the constitutional validity of Section 31aa, which was recently amended to include a specific privilege waiver requirement that school districts had to agree to in order to receive such funding. The plaintiffs, consisting of a consortium of Michigan school districts and school officials, brought suit alleging a variety of constitutional arguments, mainly that the amendment violated the Michigan Constitution due to its vagueness.

The Court of Appeals focused on the language of the subsection 9 of Section 31aa, which provides that in order to receive funding under the section, school districts “must affirmatively agree to be subject to a comprehensive investigation, must affirmatively agree to waive any privilege that may otherwise protect information from disclosure in the event of a mass casualty event, and must agree to comply with a comprehensive investigation.” Plaintiffs argued that agreeing to waive “any privilege” was unconstitutionally vague because it does not specifically identify which privileges are to be waived, whether the privileges include any held by specific individuals, or the duration of the waiver. The Court analyzed the plain meaning of “any privilege,” and reasoned that when read in context with the statute, it clearly means only those privileges held by the school district. Further, the Court stated that such privileges that are waived only refer to those privileges “related to information pertaining to a particular mass casualty event under investigation.” For example, a school district’s attorney-client privilege would only be waived in the event of a particular mass casualty event that is under investigation, and such a waiver would be limited to information pertaining to the mass casualty event. Therefore, the language concerning “any privilege” is not unconstitutionally vague.

Importantly, the Court of Appeals held that the privilege waiver “will only be triggered during a comprehensive investigation following a mass casualty event,” and that the waiver is limited “to only last during the comprehensive investigation.” Under Section 31aa, the governor is permitted to designate an individual or entity to conduct a comprehensive investigation in the event of a “mass casualty event.”

A “mass casualty event” is defined to include an incident that occurs on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event and (1) results in significant injuries to not fewer than 3 individuals, (2) results in fatalities, (3) exceeds the normal resources for emergency response available in the jurisdiction where the incident takes place, or (4) results in a sudden and timely surge of injured individuals necessitating emergency services. Plaintiffs argued that the definition of a “mass casualty event” was also unconstitutionally vague, but the Court of Appeals did not agree. For example, the Court reasoned that “significant injuries” must be “more than merely noticeable or measurable,” the injuries must be physical injuries, and that such injuries must involve 3 or more people. Further, the Court provided that the meaning of “fatalities” means two or more deaths from the same incident, due to the choice of the Legislature in using the plural form of fatalities. In sum, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the definition of “mass casualty event” was unconstitutionally vague.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Section 31aa is unconstitutional because it coerces school districts to waive the privilege through conditioning the grant money on a waiver. The Court noted that if a school district objects to the particular condition on the receipt of governmental funding, its recourse is to decline the funds. Further, although in some circumstances it is impermissible for the government to require an individual to waive constitutional rights in order to receive a benefit, the Court concluded that the school districts at issue do not have constitutional rights. Therefore, Section 31aa is not unconstitutionally coercive.

The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition that a law concerns more than one object. Plaintiffs argued that the State School Aid Act’s purpose is to provide funding to schools, and the inclusion of the privileges waiver did not relate to the State School Aid Act’s purpose. The Court concluded that the privileges waiver directly related to the State School Aid Act, as it was a condition of receiving funding for school safety. Further, the waiver relates to investigations of mass casualty events, which includes the generation of reports related to preventing future incidents and improving safety protocols. Therefore, the Court held that the waiver is constitutional.

It is prudent to note that the deadline for schools to apply for and “opt in” for funding under Section 31aa for the 2025-2026 yeah has passed, as schools had until December 4, 2025 to opt in to receive the funding, and schools had until December 30, 2025 to opt out. While schools can no longer opt in for the funding this year, the decision provides guidance to those schools who ultimately accepted the funding. Importantly, the waiver only relates to privileges held by the particular school district; the waiver will only be triggered during a comprehensive investigation following a mass casualty event, and it is limited to only last during the comprehensive investigation.

If you have questions regarding this article, please contact Alexander S. Lindamood or a member of Clark Hill’s Education and Municipal Law team.

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