California Appellate Decision Solidifies Rule on Standing for Opposing Motions for Summary Judgment by Co-Defendants

A Unified Rule on Co-Defendant Standing

The Second Appellate District’s recent opinion in Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks confirmed a clear rule that co-defendants may oppose another defendant’s motion for summary judgment (MSJ) even without having filed a cross-complaint against the moving defendant, so long as their interests are adverse. Together with prior Fourth District decisions, the opinion ensures uniform treatment of this standing issue across districts.

In doing so, the court expressly adopted the Fourth Appellate District’s recent reasoning in RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court, on which we previously reported here (“California’s Fourth Appellate District Provides Much-Needed Clarity for Summary Judgment Motions”). This now aligns two of California’s largest appellate districts and creates a uniform standard that trial courts will be expected to follow when addressing the standing issue in cases with this same procedural posture.

When read alongside CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court, the decision reinforces a clear judicial message: the right to be heard on the merits under Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §437c should not be denied due to procedural ambiguity or overly narrow statutory interpretation. A defendant whose interests are adverse to those of a moving co-defendant will not be denied standing to oppose the motion simply because it had yet to file a cross-complaint against the moving defendant. The outcome of the case also reminds practitioners that standing is only part of the equation, and that the outcome of dispositive motions will still turn on whether or not the undisputed facts warrant summary judgment.

Case Background

The Bean case arose from a standard trip-and-fall action. The plaintiff, Bonnie Bean, sued the City of Thousand Oaks and an adjacent homeowner, Gina Goode, after tripping on a raised sidewalk allegedly caused by tree roots. Goode moved for summary judgment, and Bean did not oppose the motion.

The City was understandably concerned that Goode’s dismissal would leave it as the sole remaining defendant at trial. This concern was well-founded. Under CCP § 437c(l), if a motion for summary judgment is granted on the basis that the moving defendant was without fault, no other defendant during trial, over plaintiff’s objection, may attempt to attribute fault to, or comment on, the absence or involvement of the defendant who was granted the motion. In other words, if Goode’s motion was granted, the City would be prevented under § 437(l) from any attempt to attribute fault to the absent Goode at the time of trial (i.e., the proverbial ‘empty chair’ defense).

Understandably, the City filed its own opposition arguing that Goode shared responsibility for the dangerous condition, even though it had not filed a cross-complaint for indemnity against Goode. The trial court, however, declined to consider the City’s opposition, finding the City did indeed lack standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint. The motion was therefore deemed “unopposed” and was granted, dismissing Goode from the case.

The Appellate Holding: Two Independent Bases for Reversal

RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court

First, the Bean court explicitly adopted the reasoning from the Fourth District’s recent RND Contractors decision. It noted that RND had resolved this exact issue during the pendency of the Bean appeal, concluding that an adverse co-defendant may oppose an MSJ “without the necessity of filing a cross-complaint.”

Citing the California Supreme Court case of Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court held that section 437c(b)(2) authorizes “any adverse party” to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The court emphasized that this standard depends on the functional relationship between the parties, and not whether or not they have formally filed cross-complaints against one another.

In Bean, the City’s answer alleged the “sole or partial negligence of third parties,” directly placing Goode’s potential responsibility for the plaintiff’s loss at issue as between the named defendants. That, combined with the undeniable fact that each defendant sought to shift liability to the other, was sufficient to establish an adversity of interests as between the City and Goode—even without a formal cross-complaint by either defendant against the other.

Independent Statutory Analysis

Second, the Bean court also conducted its own textual and legislative-history analysis of section 437c(p)(2), and rejected the argument that only plaintiffs or cross-complainants may oppose a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The primary textual argument against recognizing co-defendant standing stems from the text of CCP § 437c(p)(2), which states that once a moving defendant meets its burden, the “burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists.” In response to the City’s opposition to its motion, Goode argued that this clear and plain language expressly limits who can file an opposition to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment to either the plaintiff, or to a cross-complainant.  Since the City was neither a plaintiff nor a cross-complainant, Goode argued that there was no standing for the City to oppose the motion under the Code.

After reviewing the 1992 legislative history of the amendment that added this language, the court instead concluded that Section 437c(p)(2) was never intended to be a procedural limitation on standing. Instead, its sole purpose was to codify the burden-shifting framework used in federal practice under Rule 56, which likewise permits any non-movant to oppose the motion.

This analysis provided an additional, and independent, basis for recognizing co-defendant standing in these situations. Notably, although the City prevailed on the standing issue and was able to oppose the motion even without having filed a cross-complaint against Goode, the court nonetheless affirmed the judgment in favor of Goode after conducting its own de novo review of the motion on the merits.

Broader Implications

Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks should now cement a uniform rule that permits any co-defendant to oppose another defendant’s summary judgment motion even without having first filed a cross-complaint, provided that their respective interests are adverse. Together with RND Contractors and CFP BDA, these cases mark a consistent judicial philosophy: California courts not only favor having cases resolved on their merits, but that this applies to dispositive motions as well, and that the latter will not be thwarted due to a narrow reading and application of CCP § 437c.

Yet Bean also carries a cautionary note: while the City won the battle over standing, it lost the war on the merits. Thus, while the decision does indeed ensure every adverse litigant’s right to oppose and be heard on a dispositive motion, it also reminds us that, once heard, the opposition must still be strong enough to defeat the motion!