U.S. Strikes New Trade Frameworks with Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala & El Salvador - Targeted Tariff Relief and Strategic Signals for the Hemisphere

On Nov. 13, 2025, the White House announced a series of new trade framework agreements with Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador, representing the Trump Administration’s most active trade engagement in the Western Hemisphere this year. These arrangements include select tariff reductions, new regulatory and non-tariff commitments, and anticipated follow-on agreements within the next two weeks.

Importantly, the tariff adjustments fall under the administration’s “reciprocal tariff” regime, which is grounded in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the legal authority invoked earlier this year by the Administration to impose broad tariffs on imports from a wide range of trading partners. The IEEPA-based tariffs stack on top of existing duties, and while now partially reduced for certain Latin American partners, they remain in place for most goods.

These developments carry not only commercial significance but also strategic implications, as the United States seeks to reinforce hemispheric supply chains and counterbalance China’s expanding influence across Latin America.

1. Targeted Tariff Relief

The new frameworks introduce select tariff reductions for Argentinian beef, certain Ecuadorian agricultural products (including coffee and bananas), and designated textile and apparel items from Guatemala and El Salvador. These reductions carve out relief from the broader IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs, which continue to apply at 10% for Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and 15% for Ecuador.

While exempted products from Guatemala and El Salvador will benefit from the preferential tariff rate under CAFTA-DR, exempted products from Ecuador and Argentina will instead be subject to the applicable Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”) duty in the United States.

For import-dependent sectors such as food processing, hospitality, retail, and textiles, these adjustments may lower near-term costs. However, the relief is narrow, and most tariff lines remain subject to the higher reciprocal-tariff structure.

2. Non-Tariff Commitments and Regulatory Alignment

A central feature of these frameworks is a shared commitment by partner countries to eliminate or avoid digital services taxes, strengthen intellectual property protection, and improve food, health, and safety standards, including further restrictions on goods made by forced labor. The agreements also aim to reduce selected non-tariff barriers, including customs inefficiencies and regulatory policies that have complicated U.S. market access.

For U.S. exporters of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, chemicals, machinery, and technology, these reforms could broaden opportunities in these markets and reduce longstanding compliance obstacles.

3. S. Economic Support to Argentina

The tariff actions coincide with a separate $20 billion U.S. currency-swap arrangement with Argentina’s central bank – an effort designed to bolster President Javier Milei’s stabilization program. While strategically aligned with the Trump Administration’s goal of strengthening regional partners, the swap has drawn bipartisan scrutiny, especially from members concerned about domestic agricultural pressures and the exposure of U.S. public funds.

Taken together, the tariff relief and financial support signal renewed U.S. attention to Argentina as both a political and economic partner.

The inclusion of Argentina in this broader trade package signals a U.S. intent to buttress a regional ally, while also seeking reciprocal policy alignment in key trade and regulatory areas.

4. Anticipated Full Agreements and Broader Negotiations

Administration officials have stated that full reciprocal trade agreements with the four countries are expected within a few weeks. These may expand tariff preferences, clarify rules of origin, and add more detailed commitments on digital trade, regulatory practices, and increased labor and environmental standards.

The frameworks also fit into a wider global strategy: earlier this year, the administration negotiated reciprocal-tariff reductions with the EU, Japan, and South Korea, and similar talks are underway with Switzerland and multiple Asian partners. Latin America now joins the next wave of the Administration’s effort to recalibrate supply chains and build more stable, politically aligned trade corridors.

Geopolitical Considerations

Economic policy is never isolated from geopolitical consequences. Accordingly, these agreements serve a dual purpose: they lower targeted trade frictions while advancing a quiet re-anchoring of U.S. influence in a region where China has become a leading supplier and investor.

By incentivizing regulatory alignment, pursuing IEEPA-based tariff adjustments, and extending financial support to key partners, the agreements reflect that economic integration in the hemisphere is now a component of strategic competition. As supply chains shift away from Asia, and especially China, Latin American partners may become increasingly central to U.S. commercial and security priorities.

What U.S. Businesses Should Do Now

As these new frameworks move toward full implementation, U.S. companies should begin reviewing their supply chains, tariff exposure, and potential market openings.

Importers will want to assess whether their products qualify for the targeted relief and how the remaining IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs affect landed costs.

Exporters should consider whether improved regulatory conditions in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador create new commercial opportunities, particularly in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and technology.

Compliance and regulatory teams should also monitor forthcoming changes to digital services rules, IP protections, and food-safety standards. Early preparation will help businesses position themselves for the next phase of U.S. engagement in the Western Hemisphere.

For the current list of products excluded from reciprocal tariffs under Chapter 99 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, or for further information, please contact any member of Clark Hill’s International Trade Practice:

• Mark Ludwikowski (mludwikowski@clarkhill.com; 202-640-6680)
• Kevin Williams (kwilliams@clarkhill.com; 312-985-5907)
• Kelsey Christensen (kchristensen@clarkhill.com; 202-640-6670)
• Aristeo Lopez (alopez@clarkhill.com; 202-552-2366)
• Laura M. Quesada (Lquesada@clarkhill.com; 202-240-0170)

This publication is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or a solicitation to provide legal services. The information in this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship. Readers should not act upon this information without seeking professional legal counsel. The views and opinions expressed herein represent those of the individual author only and are not necessarily the views of Clark Hill PLC. Although we attempt to ensure that postings on our website are complete, accurate, and up to date, we assume no responsibility for their completeness, accuracy, or timeliness.