The cyclist’s “take the lane” dilemma: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court weighs in

It’s an everyday dilemma for many cyclists: Should you leave the roadway when faster-moving traffic approaches? According to a recent decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (and as with many legal issues), it depends.

On July 31, 2021, Brendan Linton was operating his bicycle on a heavily trafficked state highway in Butler Township. A Pennsylvania State Trooper saw traffic backing up behind Linton, with speeds dropping to as low as 12 mph in a 45 mph zone. Linton was charged with violating Section 3364(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, which requires cyclists to “use reasonable efforts so as not to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic.” According to Linton, the road’s shoulder was hazardous with repaved potholes, loose gravel, rumble strips, and sewer grates.

Linton argued there was no situation in which it would be reasonable to expect cyclists to leave the road for faster-moving traffic. The trial court nonetheless found Linton guilty, concluding he should have moved to the shoulder when vehicles were behind him. The Superior Court affirmed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court (in a 5-2 decision) reversed and remanded and held that Section 3364(b)(2) calls for a fact-bound assessment of reasonableness rather than an absolute rule. While acknowledging that there may be circumstances under which reasonable efforts could include temporarily leaving the roadway, the Court emphasized that this determination must be made based on all relevant factors and circumstances, including: the type of road and number of lanes, posted speed limits, physical conditions of both the roadway and shoulder, weather and time of day, the number of impeded vehicles, frequency of oncoming traffic, the number of vehicles able to safely pass, and the average time vehicles spend behind the bicycle.

The court’s reasoning centered on statutory construction principles and the legislative history of Section 3364. Initially finding the statute ambiguous when read in isolation, the court resolved the ambiguity by noting that when the General Assembly added the bicycle-specific provision in 2012, it deliberately placed subsection (b)(2) under the same heading as subsection (b)(1): “Slow moving vehicle to drive off roadway.” The court concluded this placement was intentional and indicated the General Assembly’s intent that bicyclists might sometimes need to leave the roadway, but under different standards than other vehicles.

The court distinguished bicycles from other vehicles, noting that given their typically smaller size, it may be possible for traffic to safely pass a cyclist who remains on the highway but moves to the far-right side of the lane. This distinction justified the statute’s approach of requiring explicit roadway departure for other vehicles while imposing the more flexible “reasonable efforts” standard for cyclists.

The court remanded the case to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence under this fact-intensive standard. The ruling balances the rights of cyclists to use public roads with the need to maintain a reasonable traffic flow, rejecting both the absolute prohibition on requiring cyclists to leave roadways (as Linton argued) and the rigid requirement that they always must do so when faster traffic approaches. A highly critical dissenting opinion raised important practical concerns about the majority’s approach, arguing that the multi-factor test is essentially unworkable for cyclists in real-world situations and would effectively force them to always leave the roadway to avoid legal risk.

At the end of the day, more bike lanes (and ideally, bike lanes that are protected) would benefit both drivers and cyclists from a safety, traffic efficiency, and legal standpoint.

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