California’s Fourth Appellate District provides much-needed clarity for summary judgment motions

In the landscape of California civil litigation, few procedural devices carry the weight, complexity, and consequence of a motion for summary judgment (MSJ). Governed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c (which sets forth the standards and procedures for obtaining summary adjudication of claims without trial), MSJs frequently determine case outcomes before ever reaching a jury. Two recent decisions from the Fourth Appellate District, RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court and CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court, offer crucial guidance for practitioners, clarifying persistent uncertainties surrounding the filing and opposition of these pivotal motions.

The first, RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court, addresses the question of standing: whether a co-defendant can oppose another defendant’s MSJ absent first having filed a cross-complaint against the moving co-defendant (and often times, in a case where the plaintiff has chosen not to oppose the MSJ.) The second, CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court, tackles the friction between statewide statutory deadlines for filing an MSJ and the administrative demands of local court rules.

These rulings are more than just isolated clarifications. When viewed together, they represent a unified judicial philosophy emphasizing substance over procedure. RND Contractors and CFP BDA collectively reinforce a core principle of California jurisprudence: a litigant’s statutory right to seek or oppose summary judgment on the merits should not be frustrated by procedural technicalities or administrative obstacles.

Standing to Oppose: RND Contractors and the “Adverse” Co-Defendant

A. An Issue of First Impression

In RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court, a case of first impression under California law, the court confronted a novel question in California law: When one defendant files an MSJ and the plaintiff does not oppose, can another co-defendant oppose the motion absent a cross-claim against the moving defendant? The appellate court answered affirmatively, holding that the non-moving defendant may oppose the MSJ if that party and the moving defendant are adverse to one another, and further, that there need not be cross-claims between those parties for them to be considered “adverse.”

The case arose after a construction site failure killed one worker and severely injured another. Plaintiffs sued various defendants, including Wiseman + Rohy Structural Engineers (WRSE) and Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour). Balfour then filed cross-claims against RND Contractors, Inc. (RND). When WRSE moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs responded by filing statements of non-opposition to the motion. RND and Balfour, however, opposed the motion, arguing that WRSE was at least partially liable for the plaintiffs’ damages. The trial court refused to consider RND’s and Balfour’s oppositions, finding that they lacked standing to oppose WRSE’s MSJ because RND and Balfour had not filed cross-claims against WRSE. The trial court then granted WRSE’s effectively unopposed motion.

RND filed a petition for a writ of mandate asking the appellate court to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting WRSE’s motion for summary judgment and reconsider the motion after reviewing the oppositions from RND and Balfour. In granting the petition, the appellate court concluded that the trial court should have considered RND’s and Balfour’s oppositions to WRSE’s MSJ, and that its refusal to do so was prejudicial.

The trial court had found that there was no precedent for this issue and that the two relevant subdivisions of California’s summary judgment statute, Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (p)(2) and (l), were “less than clear.” After discussing a handful of unpublished state opinions and federal trial court decisions addressing the issue, the trial court concluded that a codefendant may not oppose another defendant’s MSJ unless there are cross-claims between them. However, in so doing, the court also stated that there was “no clear path” and that the issue was “ripe for further appellate work,” an invitation the Fourth Appellate District seemingly accepted.

B. The Strategic Peril of an Unopposed MSJ

Commonly, a plaintiff may decide that it wants to dismiss a defendant whom they believe is not liable (or for other strategic reasons), and will agree to not oppose that defendant’s MSJ, rather than just voluntarily dismissing the defendant. Strategically, this makes sense because if the unopposed MSJ is granted on the basis that the moving defendant was “without fault,” the remaining defendants are legally barred from arguing at trial that the now-absent party was a cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(l) dictates that no other defendant, over the plaintiff’s objection, “may attempt to attribute fault to, or comment on, the absence or involvement of the defendant who was granted the motion.” The appellate court recognized this potential prejudice, particularly when the moving defendant has substantial liability.

While it can be the case that the scenario of the unopposed MSJ could, in some circumstances, pose little risk of prejudice to the non-moving defendant, provided that the evidence truly demonstrated a lack of liability on the part of the moving defendant, this is clearly not the case where the moving defendant has substantial potential liability. Take, for example, the scenario in which the substantially culpable defendant has no insurance coverage or is otherwise judgment-proof, and for these reasons, a plaintiff decides not to oppose its MSJ. If the remaining defendants were unable to oppose the motion for summary judgment, and could present admissible evidence demonstrating the moving defendant’s liability, the scenario would indeed pose substantial prejudice to the non-moving defendants, and leave them with no ability to attribute any degree of fault to the more culpable defendant at trial under the aforementioned preclusion of Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(l).

C. A Functional Test for Adversity Over Formal Pleadings

There are also legitimate reasons for one defendant to not file a cross-complaint against another co-defendant, such as initially presenting a united defense, preserving business relationships, or because the potential liability of a co-defendant is not known until well into discovery. Notwithstanding these strategic reasons for refraining from filing a cross-complaint against a co-defendant, the appellate court eschewed a formalistic analysis of standing that focused solely on whether the defendants had filed cross-complaints against one another. Instead, it undertook a more holistic analysis of the factual record to determine whether or not RND and WRSE were “adverse parties,” making that the determining factor. The holding was clear: a party may oppose a motion for summary judgment if it is “adverse” to the moving party, and the existence of cross-claims is not a prerequisite to establishing that adversity.

In concluding that adverse parties may oppose the other’s MSJ, the court relied on dicta from the 2001 California Supreme Court case of Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. In Aguilar, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subdivision (b)(2) as providing that any party may oppose a motion for summary judgment so long as that party is “adverse” to the moving party, although the issue of standing to oppose an MSJ had not been an issue in the appeal in that case. The RND court found this dicta to be “highly persuasive and should generally be followed.” The court then constructed a functional definition of “adverse party” by examining other contexts in California law, noting that for new trial motions, an adverse party is one whose interests “will be affected by the granting of the motion.” Similarly, in the context of good-faith settlements, co-defendants “are clearly adverse parties” when one settles with the plaintiff.

The record below demonstrates that WRSE, Balfour, and RND were undeniably adverse because they were all trying to escape liability by blaming someone else for plaintiffs’ damages. WRSE claimed the construction of the project, which it was not involved in, caused the collapse. RND argued that, at a minimum, WRSE bore some liability for plaintiffs’ injuries because of its involvement with the project’s negligent design. Given this “finger-pointing,” coupled with RND’s and Balfour’s position that WRSE was at least partially liable for plaintiffs’ injuries, the appellate court concluded that the co-defendants were indeed adverse parties, even though there were no cross-claims between them.

Thus, a defendant now doesn’t need to worry about the lack of a cross-complaint if it decides to oppose a co-defendant’s MSJ, provided, however, that it can demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of disputed material facts regarding the moving defendant’s degree of fault.

The Primacy of Statute: CFP BDA and the Limits of Local Court Rules

The second key ruling, CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court, addresses another critical procedural barrier affecting summary judgment motions, the conflict between statewide statutory deadlines and local court administrative rules.

A. When Local Calendaring Rules Clash with State Law

In CFP BDA LLC v. Superior Court, the Fourth Appellate District granted a petition for writ of mandate after the trial court refused to set and hear petitioner’s MSJ because the motion was not filed within a time period set by local court rule, notwithstanding the fact that the MSJ was timely filed and served pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.

Petitioners had timely reserved a hearing date for their MSJ via the Riverside Court Reservation System. The motion was timely filed and served pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(2). However, Riverside County Local Rule 3310 required parties to use the reservation system to schedule all motions, and further required all moving papers to be filed no later than 10 court days after the reserving party reserves a hearing date.

Here, because petitioners did not file their moving papers within 10 court days of reserving the hearing date, their MSJ was rejected and their hearing date was cancelled. Petitioners then reserved the next available MSJ hearing date on another date (which was less than the required 30 days before trial) and then applied ex parte to specially set the hearing date for a date that did fall within 30 days of the trial date as required by statute. The trial court summarily denied the request without a hearing and subsequently denied their formal motion to specially set the hearing date and for relief from default pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 473 (i.e., mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect) for failing to timely file the motion pursuant to the local rule.

B. The Court’s Mandate: A Timely Filed Motion Must Be Heard

The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by refusing to set the MSJ for hearing as required by the case of Cole v. Superior Court (Cole) and other case law. Cole held that a trial court could not refuse to consider an MSJ that was timely filed, and that local rules and practices may not be applied so as to prevent the filing and hearing of such a motion. In this case, there was no question that petitioners failed to comply with the local court rule. However, the MSJ was indeed filed within the statutory timeframe and petitioners were not dilatory in doing so, in that they had reserved a hearing date over six months ahead of time (which ensured such a date would be available), and also complied with the code by timely serving and filing their motion 81 days ahead of the hearing.

Notwithstanding the local rule’s intent to facilitate and manage the court’s calendar, the appellate court found that where the local rule is applied in such a way that it prevents a timely-filed MSJ from being heard, case law required that the trial court make accommodations so the matter may be considered on its merits. The court emphasized that the trial court had an affirmative duty to find a solution, such as continuing the trial date or shortening the time for the hearing, to ensure the statutorily-compliant motion was heard.

Conclusion

In California, motions for summary judgment are subject to a wide array of procedural hurdles and other non-substantive requirements. These two appellate decisions provide what every practitioner yearns for: clarity. The ruling in RND Contractors protects a co-defendant’s right to a fair allocation of fault by preventing procedural gamesmanship, while the decision in CFP BDA ensures that a litigant’s statutory right to seek summary judgment is not frustrated by local court administration. That clarity should go very far in helping to prevent the seemingly arbitrary rejection of well-founded oppositions to MSJs (as in the case of RND Contractors), and timely filed motions (as in the case of CFP BDA.) Together, these rulings reinforce a core principle of California jurisprudence: that cases should be resolved on their substantive merits, not on procedural technicalities.

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