IEEPA Returns: New Cuba EO Authorizes Tariffs on Imports from Countries Supplying Oil to Cuba

On Jan. 29, 2026, President Trump signed an Executive Order (“EO” or “Order”) titled Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba. The EO declares a national emergency and creates a process under which the United States may impose additional tariffs on products from third countries that sell or provide oil to Cuba.

Key Takeaways

• Not a tariff on Cuba. Instead, this is a tariff framework targeting imports from countries that supply oil to Cuba.
• Effective Jan. 30, 2026 (12:01 a.m. ET), but rates/country determinations require follow-on action.
• Importers should watch for designations, effective dates, and CBP implementation guidance.

Effect of the Executive Order

The Order declares a national emergency based on Cuba’s hosting of hostile countries, support for terrorism, and contributions to regional instability to the detriment of American security and foreign policy. To combat this national emergency, the EO sets out a tariff system, in lieu of a tariff rate schedule, as the administration has previously done in other trade related Orders. Bottom line: the policy aim is to deter third-country oil flows to Cuba by putting those countries’ exports to the United States at risk.

The Order authorizes imposition of an additional ad valorem duty on goods imported into the United States that are products of a foreign country that directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba. Routing oil to Cuba through intermediaries will not insulate third countries from the effect of the EO.

In practice, this operates like a “secondary sanctions” concept using tariffs: it is not a tariff on Cuba, but a tariff aimed at third countries to change behavior. In that sense, this structure resembles other recent uses of trade pressure tied to third-country energy transactions, such as the late summer 2025 tariff imposed on India due to its continued purchase of discounted oil from Russia. However, the Cuba framework is much broader as it is not limited to a single country or sector.

Implementation Mechanics (How the EO Works)

In its present form, the authority to impose tariffs is not self-executing for any specific country nor are any country or industry exceptions mentioned.

Without another structure set forth, the process to impose tariffs would involve the Department of Commerce making an initial finding regarding a foreign country directly selling or otherwise providing any oil to Cuba.

After Commerce makes a finding, the Department of State, consulting with Treasury, Commerce, DHS, and USTR, evaluates whether and to what extent additional duties should be imposed, and provides a recommendation for Presidential action.

The procedure of how countries would be identified as trading oil with Cuba is still unclear. There is also no advisory as to the process of a country being delisted after being found to provide oil to Cuba and subsequently adjusting its trade policy.

The Order is effective 12:01 a.m. Eastern on Jan. 30, 2026, but tariff rates and any covered-country determinations depend on the implementing process and follow-on guidance.

Developing Details (What We’re Waiting On)

No tariff amounts have been announced yet. We expect follow-on guidance from Commerce/State and operational instructions from Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) addressing how covered countries will be identified, how and when additional duties will apply, and how importers should declare affected entries. The Order defines “oil” as crude oil or petroleum products, suggesting the trigger can include crude or refined petroleum products. However, additional guidance is likely to clarify the scope and evidentiary standards.

The Administration will have to make decisions about how to implement this tariff and whether it will be country-wide, meaning all products from countries found to be providing Cuba with oil will be hit with tariffs; or if this will be limited to a specific sector or product being imported into the United States that will receive the tariff if the exporting country is found to be in violation of the EO.

The Order leaves several timing questions unanswered, including: (i) whether there will be a practical “ramp-up” period; (ii) what look-back period the government will use to assess compliance; and (iii) how quickly a country may be reassessed (and duties lifted) if it changes course.

Global Picture- Why Now?

The timing is notable. Even as the Supreme Court considers the scope of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) tariffs, the Administration is again invoking IEEPA to build a new tariff framework.

The Order also includes an express modification clause, including in response to retaliation or changed circumstances, underscoring the Administration’s preference for flexibility. In other words, even with the SCOTUS decision looming, the Administration is signaling its intent to continue aggressively using economic tools to achieve its executive agenda. It serves as a reminder that this is not just courtroom theory, but live trade and foreign policy, with the Administration undeterred by the pending litigation.

The IEEPA statute requires the framing of a national emergency, however the EO focuses this backdrop as a national security and foreign policy issue. This may help preserve the effects of the EO even after SCOTUS renders its decision on the Administration’s use of IEEPA.

The EO both continues to draw authority from IEEPA and contemplates future litigation as it contains a “Modification Authority” clause. This language makes the Order and its effects resilient and adjustable, attempting to fortify some legal vulnerabilities. Additionally, the EO contains some flexibility in its decision-making process. Though ultimately still at the President’s discretion, the delegation and consultation language throughout the Order, creates both more oversight and insulated deviations that could be challenged as opposed to attacking the whole Order.

Geopolitical Context

This EO fits an emerging pattern: the Administration is increasingly using trade tools as instruments of geopolitics, not just as economic levers. Over the last year, we have seen trade policy pulled into broader strategic objectives, from North American supply-chain and market-access pressure points tied to USMCA, to policy signals linked to strategic geography and trade routes (including Greenland), and to Western Hemisphere security framing in situations involving countries such as Venezuela. The Cuba EO continues that trajectory: the White House fact sheet and Order emphasize national security and foreign policy concerns, and the tariff mechanism appears designed to pressure third countries to change behavior (i.e., Cuba-related energy supply), rather than to target Cuba directly.

What Companies Should Do Now

While details are still emerging, this EO is a broad importer-risk signal, not just an “oil sector” measure. Duties could attach to imports across product categories if the exporting country is determined to supply oil to Cuba. Companies can prepare by:

• Identifying supply-chain exposure to countries that could be designated (even if their business does not trade in oil).
• Reviewing contracts for duty-allocation and tariff-change clauses.
• Monitoring for implementing guidance, covered-country determinations, and any “effective for entries after (date)” trigger.

Contact Clark Hill

If this development is of interest to your business or if you have questions regarding the content of this alert, please contact any member of Clark Hill’s International Trade Practice for additional details and strategic guidance.

• Mark Ludwikowski (mludwikowski@clarkhill.com; 202.640.6680)
• Kevin Williams (kwilliams@clarkhill.com; 312.985.5907)
• Kelsey Christensen (kchristensen@clarkhill.com; 202.230.9889)
• Aristeo Lopez (alopez@clarkhill.com; 202.552.2366)
• Ashley Gifford (agifford@clarkhill.com; 202.640.6655)
• Laura M. Quesada (Lquesada@clarkhill.com; 202.240.0170)
• Amal Sheheen (Asheheen@clarkhill.com; 202.552.2354)
• Onjoly Purification (Opurification@clarkhill.com; 202.552.2361)

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